Carl Baldwin and Larry Gleim v. Vantage Corp. : Appellants\u27 Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1982
Carl Baldwin and Larry Gleim v. Vantage Corp. :
Appellants' Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ray M. Harding, Jr.; Attorney for Appellants;
Edwar M. Garrett; Attorney for Respondent;
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Baldwin v. Vantage Corp., No. 18202 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2875
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARL BALDWIN and LARRY GLEIM, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
'VS. CASE NO. 
VANTAGE CORPORATION, a Utah 
· corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
APPELLANTS.' REPLY BRIEF 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Fourth 
District Court of Utah County, 
Honorable Robert Bullock 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
EDWARD M. GARRETT 
tt!+t~RNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
311 South State Street 
. Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RAY M •. HARDING, JR. 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS 
58 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 532 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
FILED 
JUL 2· 71982 
·······---~-,,,...-----------~---··· .. ,,;.tilii/liill 
- - L 11.L-"" 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARL BALDWIN and LARRY GLEIM, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. CASE NO. 18202 
VANTAGE CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Fourth 
District Court of Utah County, 
Honorable Robert Bullock 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
EDWARD M. GARRETT 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
311 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RAY M. HARDING, JR. 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS 
58 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 53 2 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CITATIONS • • • • • • • • 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT' S STATEMENT OF FACTS • 
ARGUMENT • 
. . 
ii 
1 
2 
I. REPLY TO POINT I OF RESPONDENT'S BRIEF • • 2 
A. REPLY TO "SUFFICIENT MEMORANDUM" • 
B. REPLY TO "PART PERFORMANCE" 
2 
5 
II. REPLY TO POINT II OF RESPONDENT'S BRIEF. • 8 
A. REPLY TO "VANTAGES' ANSWER" 9 
B. REPLY TO "TESTIMONY OF APPELLANTS" 10 
C. REPLY TO "THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING 
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING" • 12 
CONCLUSION • • 15 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 17 
-i-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CITATI.QN..S 
CASES: 
Anderson v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 
583 P.2d 101 (Utah, 1978) • , •• 
Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862 (Utah, 1978) ••• 
DeVas y. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290 (1962) • 
Gregerson y, Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 (Utah, 1980) 
Guinand y. Walton, 22 Utah 2d 196, 
450 P.2d 467 (1967) 
Santi y, Denyer and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 
10,11 
15 
10,11 
3 
3 
12 Utah 2d 157, 442 P.2d 921 (1968) 14 
Schwedes y. Romain, 587 P.2d 388 (Mont. 1978) • 7 
Skerel y. Willow Creek Coal Co., 
92 Utah 474, 69 P.2d 502 (1937) •••• 14 
Swinney y, Continental Bldg. Co., 340 Mo. 611, 
102 S.W.2d 111 (1937) •••• I • 6 
Utah Mercur Gold Min. Co. y, Herschel Gold Min, Co., 
103 Utah 249, 134 P.2d 1094 (1934) • • • • . 7 
STATUTES: 
Section 25-5-1, U.C.A. 1953 
Section 25-5-3 U.C.A. 1953 
-ii-
• 3 
• • • • 4 
.. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARL BALDWIN and LARRY GLEIM, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
VANTAGE CORPORATION, a Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
) 
. Defendant-Respondent. ) 
CASE NO. 18202 
Appellants, having been served with Respondent's 
Brief, respectfully submit the following R~ply Brief, answer-
ing the new matters set forth in Respondent's Brief. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT' S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although Respondent's Statement of the Facts is 
basically correct, Appellants wish to call attention to some 
of the misleading and incorrect statements found therein. 
First, on page 3 of its Brief, Respondent refers to 
"the contract to sell the seven (7) lotsn. This is not 
correct because this lawsuit does not involve all seven of the 
original lots, but only four (4). In addition, there are four 
(4) separate contracts involved in this dispute rather than 
just one. 
Second, Respondent states that VANTAGE denies the 
existence of a loan guarantee (Brief of Respondent, page 3). 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
However, the only representative of VANTAGE who was a party to 
the contract negotiations was DOUG BOULTON and therefore, DOUG 
BOULTON is the only witness who can affirm or deny, on behalf 
of VANTAGE, the existence of a loan guarantee. On both direct 
and cross-examination Mr·. BOULTON testified that loan guaran-
tees were periodically made. (Tr. pp. 77, 88). 
ARGUMENT 
I. REPLY TO POINT I OF RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Respondent first complains that this case represents 
an uncommon use of the Statute of Frauds as opposed to a 
traditional use. Respondent, however, has not cited any 
authority for the proposition that there is a "traditional 
use" of the Statute of Frauds. The statutory language of the 
Utah Statute of Frauds does not limit the application of the 
statute in any way nor does it indicate a proper or tradi-
tional application. The statute simply renders some con-
tracts unenforceable. Therefore, Respondent' s argument that 
this case represents an "uncommon" use of the Statute of 
Frauds is entirely irrelevant. 
A. REPLY TO "SUFFICIENT MEMORANDUM" 
In addition to misinterpreting the applicable case 
-2-
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law, Respondent has raised new matters which need some 
attention. 
Respondent cites Guinand v. Walton, 22 Utah 2d 196, 
450 P.2d 467 (1967) for the rule that all that is required for 
a writing to be sufficient "is that the interest be granted or 
declared by a writing subscribed by the party to be charged" 
(Brief of Respondent, page 8) (Appellants cite Guinand v. 
Walton, supra, for the same rule; Brief of Appellants, page 
27). Respondent also relies on Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 
369 (Utah, 1980) for the proposition that where some "nexis" 
is present, several writings may be construed together in 
order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. 
Appellants do not dispute these rules of law but·the 
facts of this case establish that the requirements of the 
Statute of Frauds have not been met even if all of the 
writings are construed together. 
In support of this position, Appellants submit that 
Respondent has not produced a written instrument, or even 
several writings construed together, which "grant" or 
"declare" the property interest conveyed under the oral con-
tract. Appellants also submit that Respondent has failed to 
establish that the clear requirements set forth in the Utah 
Statute of Frauds have been met. 
Section 25-5-1, u.c.A. 1953, as amended, states that 
no interest in real property shall be created, granted, 
-3-
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assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by deed or 
conveyance in writing. This section further requires that the 
writing be "subscribed by the party creating, granting, 
assigning, surrendering or declaring" the interest or estate 
conveyed. Similarly, Section 25-5-3 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, 
states in part: 
"Every contract for • • • the sale, of any 
lands, or any interest in lands, shall be 
void unless the contract ••• is in writing 
subscribed by the party by whom the lease 
or sale is to be made, or by his lawful 
agent • • • " 
In the case at bar there is no evidence of any writ-
ten instrument containing the signature of Respondent' s agents 
or respresentatives. The signature of the party conveying the 
property interest or selling the land is an essential element 
in order to remove an oral contract from the Statute of 
Frauds. 
One other important clarification must be made. On 
page 9 of his Brief, Respondent has stated that "the writings 
in this case consist of three (3) checks, a letter, and 
detailed ledgers". Even though the ledgers do not "grant" or 
"declare" the property interest conveyed, Appellants main-
tain that these writings cannot be construed as part of the 
contracts for the sale of the subject lots. These writings 
were introduced into evidence by an accountant (TR p. 97) for 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN. They were created by the 
-4-
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accountant (after the sale) and not by the parties to the 
contract negotiations and they only reflect accounting 
en tr i es • ( TR p • 9 8 ) 
Thus, the only writings which can properly be con-
strued together in an effort to meet the requirements of the 
Statute of Frauds are the checks and the letter. As stated 
above, however, even when the ledgers are viewed along with 
the other writings, the requirements of the Statute of Frauds 
have not been met since all of the essential terms of the con-
tracts are not contained therein. Specifically, nowhere is 
the property interest granted or declared (See Brief of Appel-
lants, p. 28) and there is no writing subscribed by the 
Respondent. 
B. REPLY TO "PART PERFORMANCE". 
Respondent begins its argument under this issue by 
restating (inaccurately) Appellants' argument on part perfor-
mance found in the Opening Brief. Appellants feel that the 
argument has been properly stated in the Opening Brief and 
that there is no need for Respondent's recharacterization. 
Respondent next argues that rather than seven sep-
arate contracts for the seven lots, there was only one con-
tract. Respondent further argues that "there is substantial 
evidence of record to support such a finding" (Brief of 
-5-
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Respondent, p. 11) • This "substantial evidence" is simply 
not found in the record. The facts set forth on page 11 of 
Respondent's Brief do not constitute evidence of a single 
contract. 
Appellants' position as to the existence of seven 
separate contracts is clearly set forth in the Opening Brief 
(Brief of Appellants, p. 29) • It is important to note, how-
ever, that even if there was only one contract, the resale of 
three lots by Appellants still does not constitute part per-
formance which will bring the oral contract out of the Statute 
of Frauds. 
If there was a single contract, both parties proceeded 
as if the contract was severable as to each lot. Severable or 
divisible contracts are, in legal effect, made up of indepen-
dent agreements about different subjects, made at the same 
time. Swinney v. Continental Bldg. Co., 340 Mo. 611, 102 
S.W.2d 111 (1937). Thus, if there is only one contract, that 
contract is the subject of this lawsuit and it no longer in-
cludes that portion of the original agreement which has been 
completely performed and severed. At this time there is no 
part performance other than part payment of the purchase price 
on the contract. This part payment does not remove the oral 
contract from the Statute of Frauds. (See Brief of Appellants, 
pp. 30-32) 
-6-
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Respondent also complains that it should not be pre-
vented from enforcing the contract because of the Statute of 
Frauds and at the same time, prevented from denying the con-
tract by reason of the Doctrine of Part Performance. (Brief 
of Respondent, p. 11) This statement makes no sense because 
the situation described by Respondent cannot possibly exist. 
First, if the contract is void under the Statute of 
Frauds, Respondent is permitted to deny it. On the other 
hand, if the Doctrine of Part Performance is applicable, the 
Statute of Frauds is not. In other words, the Doctrine of 
Part Performance and the effects of the Statute of Frauds 
cannot apply to the same contract. In view of this, Respon-
dent does not need to caution the Court on the application of 
the Statute of Frauds and the Doctrine of Part Performance. 
(Brief of Respondent, p. 11) 
Another new issue raised by Respondent is that the 
Doctrine of Part Performance must be available to the seller 
if it is available to the buyer. Appellants agree that the 
Doctrine is available to the seller of real property if the 
seller has done something which constitutes part performance. 
The seller cannot rely on the part performance of the buyer to 
enforce an oral contract which falls within the Statute of 
Frauds. Utah Mercur Gold Min. Co. v. Herschel Gold Mjn. Co., 
103 Utah 249, 134 P.2d 1094 (1934); Schwedes y. Romain, 587 
P.2d 388 (Mont. 1978); Brief of Appellants, pp. 29-30. 
-7-
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Finally, it should be noted that Respondent has mis-
stated the facts in its factual summary found on page 12 of 
its Brief. Both parties do not admit the existence of one 
contract5 
The undisputed facts clearly establish that the 
parties entered into an oral contract for the sale of land. 
The Respondent, as the party seeking to establish that the 
contract can be saved from the Statute of Frauds, has the 
burden of so proving. Appellants strongly maintain that the 
Respondent failed to carry this burden, and that the trial 
court erroneously found that the Statute of Frauds did not 
apply. This error alone warrants a reversal. 
II. REPLY TO POINT II OF RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Respondent begins its argument by restating and re-
characterizing the arguments set forth in Appellants' Brief. 
As stated above, Appellants feel that the arguments are 
properly stated in the Opening Brief and there is no need for 
Respondent's recharacterization. Moreover, Respondent mis-
states Appellants' argument by characterizing "the thrust" of 
all of Appellants' arguments in terms of a single finding of 
fact. Although Appellants do contend that Finding of Fact No. 
11 is erroneous, Appellants' arguments go well beyond the 
scope of this finding. (i.e., Appellants' argument as to the 
-8-
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Statute of Frauds does not depend upon the finding that the 
guarantee was made.) 
Also, the statement found in Finding No. 11 that "The 
most convincing evidence is that no employee of VANTAGE COR-
PORATION or its parent, DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, had authority to bind the Association to make a 
future loan" is misleading as to the applicable law. {This 
point is more fully discussed below.) 
A. REPLY TO "VANTAGES' ANSWER" 
Respondent relies heavily on the argument that Appel-
lants knew all along that Respondent would dispute the exis-
tence of ~he guarantee. {Brief of Respondent, p. 16) This, 
however, has little or nothing to do with the applicable law 
since the existence of a judicial admission does not depend on 
the opposing party's reliance thereon. As Respondent has 
stated, this admission is a judicial admission {Brief of 
Respondent, p. 17) and should be given the evidentiary weight 
accorded to such admissions. (See Appellants' Brief, pp. 
18-21) 
B. REPLY TO "TESTIMONY OF APPELLANTS" 
As more fully explained in the Opening Brief {pages 
8-18), the trial court abused its discretion in finding that 
-9-
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no guarantee of construction financing was made. Under point 
II(B) of its Brief, Respondent argues that this finding was 
not an abuse of discretion. In support of this argument, 
Respondent cites DeVas y. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290 
(1962) and Anderson y. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 583 
P.2d 101 (Utah, 1978) • 
On page 18 of its Brief, Respondent states that in 
DeVas v. Noble, supra, this court affirmed a "ruling in favor 
of the defendant despite the uncontradicted direct testimony 
of the plaintiff". This is incorrect. The plaintiff, Hattie 
DeVas, prevailed in the trial court and the Supreme Court 
affirmed. 
In DeVas, the central question was whether the Statute 
of Limitations had run before the plaintiff commenced her 
action. Even though the plaintiff made statements which, 
under more normal circumstances, would have established that 
the Statute had run, the court found that the plaintiff's 
action was timely filed. The trial court found that the 
plaintiff had "such mental limitations that her testimony is 
unreliable" and refused to be bound by the prior "erratic 
statements". 
In addition, the trial court did not believe the 
defendant' s testimony stating that his "account of things is 
obviously false". 
Thus, the DeVas decision does not in any way support 
Respondent's conclusion that a ruling was made (and affirmed) 
-10-
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for one party despite the uncontradicted direct testimony of 
the other party. 
In addition, the rules of law set forth in Devas and 
in Anderson y. State Farm, supra, do not give the trial judge 
the prerogative to ignore uncontradicted testimony. In fact, 
the DeVas court specifically held that credible, uncontra-
dicted evidence cannot be ignored when all reasonable minds 
would accept it. There is nothing in the record which mini-
mizes the credibility of the Appellants or indicates that 
their testimony is not trustworthy. 
In order to find in favor of the Respondent, the trial 
court had to first ignore the clear, unequivocal testimony of 
both appellants and then, despite the absence of substanti-
ating testimony, find that no guarantee was made. 
It is important to note here that Appellants did not 
have to proye the existence of an enforceable guarantee. 
Appellants are entitled to rescision even where innocent and 
unintentional representations are made which would lead 
appellants to believe that construction financing was guaran-
teed. (See Appellants' Opening Brief, pages 21-25) 
Thus, even if the testimony of appellants is given 
almost no weight or credibility it stands uncontradicted and 
cannot be completely ignored. At an extreme minimum, the 
testimony of Appellants establishes that statements were made 
to them which led them to believe that construction financing 
-11-
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on the Blackhawk Estates lots was guaranteed. DOUG BOULTON, 
VANTAGE' s agent, made those statements. 
C. REPLY TO "THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE LOWER 
COURT'S FINDING" 
Appellants submit that part C of Point II of Respon-
dent' s Brief illustrates that there is virtually no evidence 
to support the lower court's finding that the guarantee was 
not made. 
First, Respondent asserts that a mere passage of time, 
coupled with the resale of some of the lots, constitutes 
"evidence" that the guarantee was not made. No authority is 
cited for this proposition and Appellants submit that if the 
passage of time is "evidence", it tends to support the fact 
that the guarantee was made. Appellant, LARRY GLEIM, testi-
fied that Respondent guaranteed the availability of construc-
·. 
tion financing "when we were ready to build homes". (TR p. 60) ~; 
Also, on cross-examination, Appellant, CARL BALDWIN, testified 
as follows: 
"Q You didn't expect the conditions that 
existed in 1978 to exist forever in that 
situation, did you? 
A I never really gave it much thought. 
I always thought that the loan would be 
guaranteed. 
Q All right. Under any circumstances, 
right? 
-12-
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A If we went in and asked for that loan 
and were able to make that loan, yes, I did 
assume that we would get that loan." (Tr. p. 39) 
Thus, a lapse of almost two years is supportive of 
Appellants' claim that the construction financing would be 
available to them when they were ready to build. 
Respondent' s next argument concerning the statements 
of Mr. DOUG BOULTON (Brief of Respondent, p. 20) again illus-
trates the absence of evidence contrary to Appellants' claim 
that a guarantee was made to them. First, Mr. BOULTON did 
testify as to his training and background but these comments 
must be viewed in light of Mr. BOULTON' s entire testimony. 
(Tr. pp. 74-75) In connection with this, Appellants direct 
the Court's attention to pages 13-15 of their Opening Brief. 
In view of Mr. BOULTON' s entire testimony, it is clear that 
his training and background has very little (if any) probative 
value as to the issue of whether the guarantee was actually 
made. 
Finally, Respondent has heavily relied upon the tes-
timony of Mr. PREBIN NIELSON to establish that neither Respon-
dent nor its agent, DOUG BOULTON, nor anyone else at DESERET 
FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION had the authority to 
commit the Association to make a loan in the future. (Brief 
of Respondent, p. 20) Somehow, Respondent interprets this 
testimony as "evidence" that the guarantee was not made. 
-13-
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In an effort to be brief, the history of the law on 
apparent and implied authority will not be reviewed. The 
undisputed facts establish that during the contract negotia-
tions Appellants had reason to believe they were dealing not 
only with VANTAGE CORPORATION but also with a lending insti-
tution: DESERET FEDERAL. All of the meetings were held in 
the offices of DESERET FEDERAL and Mr. DOUG BOULTON was an 
employee of both VANTAGE and DESERET FEDERAL. Thus, VANTAGE 
CORPORATION created circumstances which led Appellants to 
believe that Mr. BOULTON had the authority to commit VANTAGE 
and DESERET FEDERAL to provide construction loans for the 
Blackhawk Estates lots. It is a well settled rule of law that 
principles are bound by the acts of their agents when the 
agents' acts fall within the apparent scope of their authority 
and the principal will be bound where innocent third parties 
have dealt with the agent in good faith. Skerel v, Willow 
Creek Coal Co., 92 Utah 474, 69 P.2d 502 (1937); Santi y. 
Denyer and Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 12 Utah 2d 157, 
442 P.2d 921 (1968). 
In addition to being clothed with the apparent 
authority to make a loan guarantee, Mr. BOULTON had the 
implied authority to do so. Here, VANTAGE CORPORATION was 
trying to sell subdivision lots to homebuilders. DESERET 
FEDERAL, the parent corporation of VANTAGE, is a lending 
institution and carries on a profitable business by extending 
-14-
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loans. This combination of business objectives justifies the 
guarantee of construction loans as an incentive to persuade 
potential buyers to purchase the subdivision lots from 
VANTAGE. 
"The actual authority of an agent may be 
implied from the words and conduct of the 
parties and the facts and circumstances 
attending the transaction in question. 
Implied authority embraces authority to 
do whatever acts are incidental to, or 
are necessary, usual, and proper to 
accomplish or perform, the main authority 
expressly delegated to the agent." 
Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862 (Utah, 1978) 
In view of the applicable case law and the undisputed 
facts of this case, it is abundantly clear that Mr •. NIELSON' s 
testimony as to the authority expressly given to Mr. BOULTON 
does not constitute "evidence" that the guarantee was not 
made. 
CONCLUSION 
The record below and the briefs of both counsel filed 
herein lead to the conclusion that the trial court should have 
ruled in favor of the Appellants. Therefore, Appellants again 
respectfully request this court to reverse the trial court's 
judgment and require the trial court to enter judgment in 
favor of the Plaintiff' s and against the Defendant in the sum 
of $9,371.80 plus costs of court· and interest at the legal 
rate. 
-15-
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this~y of 
1982. 
HARDING & HARDING 
-16-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVTCE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two (2) copies of the foregoing 
Appellants' Reply Brief were mailed to: 
EDWARD M. GARRETT 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
311 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411)/ . 
DATED thisX1Z of ./ _,/(,j ~-l--9tl7;--
// 
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